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A point of stability in the life of the nation: The office of Chief 
Justice of New Zealand — Supreme Court judge, judicial 
branch leader, and constitutional guardian & statesperson 
DR RICHARD CORNES*,** 
I  Introduction 
What is the scope of the modern office of Chief Justice (CJ) of New Zealand? Clearly, the role extends 
beyond taking the central seat in the Supreme Court’s Kauri kernel shaped courtroom at 85 Lambton 
Quay, Wellington, (the home of the Supreme Court of New Zealand).1 Until the commencement of the 
Supreme Court Act 2003 — which, inter alia, replaced the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
London as New Zealand’s final court of appeal with the new Supreme Court — there was a lack of clarity 
as to who the nation’s top judge was.2 Within New Zealand there was the CJ. Chief Justices for the most 
part sat in the High Court (the first instance superior court). They were also eligible to sit in the first 
instance appellate court, the Court of Appeal. That court had its own full time leader: the President. The 
President presided unless the CJ was sitting. This gave rise to the potential for tension between the CJ and 
President, a point which is explored further below. In addition to the CJ and President, there was a third 
candidate. So long as cases could be appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the British 
judge chairing the Committee could be said to be New Zealand’s top judge, at least for the case before the 
Committee. As late as July 2013 a criminal case (coming under the 2003 statute’s transitional provisions) 
was heard by a panel which included the current CJ, Dame Sian Elias. She was not though in the central 
seat; Lord Hope of Craighead, a Scottish Law Lord, presided. 
                                                 
* Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand, School of Law, University of Essex, England. My thanks to, the 
Chief Justice (Dame Sian Elias), members of the Supreme Court and its staff, Chief High Court Judge Helen Winkelmann, 
Justice Grant Hammond, Sir Edmund Thomas, Pat McCabe and Brigid Corcoran, all of whom were spoken with during the 
course of the research. Thanks also, for comments on various drafts, to Dean Knight, and Andrew Le Sueur. Finally, for research 
assistance and many helpful comments, my thanks to Caroline Anderson, Lani Buchanan, and, Christopher Luff. My thinking 
about the office of CJ also benefited from discussion at a staff seminar at the Faculty of Law of The University of Otago. I 
emphasise that the article reflects only my own views; nothing in the text may be attributed to a person thanked here, except 
where indicated explicitly. 
** This paper will appear in pt.4, 2013 of the New Zealand Law Review. I am grateful to the editors for allowing this version to be 
made available via the SSRN 
1  On the design of the Court buildings see Warren and Mahoney “The Supreme Court of New Zealand” 
<www.warrenandmahoney.com>; and Courts of New Zealand “The design of the new building” 
<www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
2  On the debate concerning leaving the Privy Council, the reform process and the nature of the new Supreme Court, see 
Richard Cornes “Appealing to history: the New Zealand Supreme Court debate” (2004) 24 LS 210 and “How to create a 
new Supreme Court: learning from New Zealand” [2004] PL 59. 
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Those rare transitional cases aside (and the R v Lundy appeal must be the last, if not close to it),3 the 
2003 statute places the CJ permanently in the Supreme Court, and identifies her as “head of the New 
Zealand judiciary,” with “seniority over the other Judges of the Supreme Court”.4 Writing in 2004 on the 
possible consequences of the 2003 reform, I hypothesised that “[t]he leadership role of the Chief Justice 
will be emphasised — in relation to both the Supreme Court itself and to the judicial branch in general.”5 
After almost a decade of operation of the new Court, I return to that theme. 
To address it the discussion proceeds as follows. First, the two aims of the article are outlined: to 
describe the nature of the current office, and to argue for its role, importance and scope within New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements. Second, I comment on the concept of leadership in the judicial 
context. Third, I give a brief review of who has held the office since 1841. This is followed by a 
discussion of how the office has been understood, in particular, in official documents, together with a 
more detailed discussion of the issue of the 1958–2003 division of judicial leadership within New 
Zealand between the CJ and President of the Court of Appeal. Then comes the heart of the article: an 
elaboration of the three sets of functions of the modern office, Supreme Court judge, national judicial 
leader, and constitutional guardian and statesperson. 
II  The Office of Chief Justice — A Constitutional Realist’s Perspective 
This article has two aims. The first is to define the modern scope of the office of CJ of New Zealand, and 
in doing so, to bring out its scope and importance within New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements. 
Providing that greater degree of clarity entails outlining in detail the complexity and range of functions 
which attach to the office. In that sense my endeavour is akin to an exercise in constitutional realism of 
the kind embarked on by Matthew Palmer in his 2007 elaboration of New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements: “A constitutional realist seeks to identify and analyse all those factors which significantly 
influence the generic exercise of public power.”6 Palmer’s project was a broad one, looking across the 
entire landscape of New Zealand’s constitution. My purpose here is narrower, and focused, in part, on 
mapping the range of functions associated with the modern office of CJ. This cartographic exercise is 
based on both an analysis of legal instruments concerning the office, as well as a review of academic 
writing and official documents concerning the office and its holders from the first CJ (Sir William 
Martin), to the incumbent, Dame Sian Elias.7 
The constitutional cartography provides the context for the article’s second, and normative, aim: to 
advance an argument about what the role of the CJ should be, taking into account New Zealand’s 
contemporary constitutional culture. The heart of that argument is this proposition: New Zealand needs a 
strong, well resourced, well understood, and active office of CJ to help maintain balance in a constitution 
which is in danger of becoming dangerously skewed towards the interests and ethos of the elected 
branches (encompassing both the 120 seat legislature elected on a proportional representation basis, and 
                                                 
3  Lundy v R [2013] UKPC 28. Though see Television New Zealand “Teina Pora’s lawyers apply to Privy Council” (20 August 
2013) <www.tvnz.co.nz>. 
4  Supreme Court Act 2003, s 18(1). 
5  Richard Cornes “There’s more than one song worth singing: The Supreme Court and the legal system” (2004) 15 PLR 137 
at 144. 
6  Matthew S R Palmer “New Zealand Constitutional Culture” (2007) 22 NZULR 565 at 566. See also: Matthew S R Palmer 
“What is New Zealand’s constitution and who interprets it? Constitutional realism and the importance of public office-
holders” (2006) 17 PLR 133. 
7  The appendix lists the 12 holders of the office to date. 
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the executive drawn from it). Providing it is appropriately resourced, the office has, within its current 
statutory parameters, and history, the potential to take on this task. 
This normative goal also rests on an affirmation at the end of the purpose clause of the 2003 Act: 
“Nothing in this Act affects New Zealand’s continuing commitment to the rule of law and the sovereignty 
of Parliament.”8 Members of Parliament ably, and regularly, assert the extent of that body’s powers and 
prerogatives. And the introduction of a proportional electoral system in 1996 (the Mixed Member 
Proportional system (MMP), similar to that used in the Federal Republic of Germany) has made the 
legislature and executive far more responsive than previously to the popular will of New Zealanders. 
While MMP may have increased the executive’s accountability to parliament, it has also heightened MPs’ 
sense of primacy within the constitution, to the detriment of respect for the rule of law and the necessary 
independent voice of the judiciary. From a constitutional realist’s perspective New Zealand might now be 
said to have just two branches: the elected and the judicial. And the elected branch tends to regard itself as 
having an exclusive say in matters of public policy. Of the rule of law and the independent judicial voice 
in New Zealand, Matthew Palmer comments:9 
 
My intuitive hesitation about the rule of law as an ultimate principle of the constitution, and the reason I put 
it third behind representative democracy and parliamentary sovereignty, is a concern about how well 
entrenched the rule of law is in popular understanding and support. To the extent that it requires valuing the 
role and voice of the judiciary compared to elected politicians … it is not well entrenched in New Zealand 
constitutional culture.  
…  
[T]he rule of law [and by implication the principle of an independent judiciary] is a vulnerable 
constitutional norm in New Zealand.  
 
Judicial independence is respected in New Zealand within narrow confines. The judges, while entitled to 
autonomy for what they do within the walls of courtrooms, tend to be seen as just another group of 
stakeholders in the justice sector, servicing the needs of citizen-consumers.10 Asked by a House of Lords 
Committee in 2004, “how do you see the independence of the judiciary protected in the New Zealand 
situation?”, Elias CJ replied:11 
 
Well, I think it is a real risk in our country because I think our constitutional arrangements have been very 
obscure and I do not think it is good enough that the initiates think they know what the system is. It is one 
of the reasons why I would like to see better, more formal communication with the Legislature because I 
think we are very vulnerable on this question of independence because it is not well understood in the 
community as a whole. 
 
                                                 
8  Supreme Court Act 2003, s 3(2). 
9  Palmer, above n 6, at 588–589. 
10  On viewing judges as “stakeholders” see discussion in Sian Elias, Chief Justice of New Zealand “Discounting Justice” 
(address to the Legal Research Foundation Annual General Meeting, Auckland, 25 October 2001) at 2, available at 
<www.courtsofnz.govt.nz >. On the concept of the “Justice Sector” see Ministry of Justice “About the justice sector” 
<www.justice.govt.nz>. Finally, on the “citizen-consumer” in NZ see Gordon McLauchlan The Passionless People 
Revisited (David Bateman, Auckland, 2012) at 199–201. 
11  Lords Select Committee on Constitutional Reform Bill Constitutional Reform Bill — Minutes of Evidence  (25 May 2004) at 
Q 1091 [Minutes of Evidence], online at <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldcref/125/4052501.htm>. 
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And Sir Thomas Gault followed on with:12 
 
My anxiety is that the independence of the judiciary is most at risk through the politics of the country. In a 
way we have not had the checks and balances that you have had with a second chamber and the Lord 
Chancellor and so on. I do not feel confident that our politicians grasp the constitutional significance 
perhaps as they should. 
 
Matthew Palmer’s academic analysis and the views of Dame Sian and Sir Thomas also accorded with the 
view expressed in 2005 by the newly appointed Attorney-General, Deputy Prime Minister Michael 
Cullen. Dr Cullen, who before appointment as Attorney-General had had, as we shall see, a spirited public 
dialogue with the CJ concerning the nature of Parliament’s powers, was reported by the Herald to be, “an 
ardent advocate and protector of the judiciary, particularly against political attacks on their decisions, 
which, he [said, had] worsened under the populist approaches of MMP”.13 
To maintain both of the commitments recorded in s 3(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003, holders of 
the office of CJ need to continue to articulate assertively, in and out of court, values associated with the 
rule of law, in particular, the preservation of an independent judiciary, and the separation of powers.14 
Further, they should continue to enter into the full range of public debate to provide a distinct 
constitutional perspective — distinct in particular from the perspective of the elected branch. Certainly 
the tone and style of CJs’ extra-curial contributions should also be distinguishable from the tone and style 
of MPs; they should still though be heard on topics MPs often think of as the sole preserve of the 
legislature. This is a matter we will return to below, in particular in the section on the CJ’s role as 
constitutional guardian and  statesperson. 
Section 3(2) was included in the Act explicitly because Parliament was concerned that the new Court 
could upset the constitutional balance (in which it likes to think of itself as enjoying a pure, classic, 
Diceyan supremacy).15 The section, while referencing that concern, may also be viewed as pointing to the 
live debate at the heart of the nation’s constitutional arrangements, a debate which will be familiar outside 
of New Zealand as well: who, ultimately, has the last word as to how we are governed? In the context of 
New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, which are largely uncodified and almost entirely 
unentrenched,16 it is a debate perhaps best left unresolved. A constitutional system in which there is such 
a live debate is, after all, one in which no side has yet “won”; victors do not make good partners in a 
system premised on a separation of powers. Ensuring the debate goes on requires an active office of Chief 
Justice. 
                                                 
12  At Q 1092. 
13  Audrey Young “New job for Cullen will temper constitutional row” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 26 
March 2005) (emphasis added). 
14  See Thomas Eichelbaum on the role of judges in widening public understanding of the judicial role in his “The Inaugural 
Neil Williamson Memorial Lecture: Judicial Independence Revisited” [1997] 6 Canta LR 421 at 426. 
15  We may wonder whether Parliament comprehended the extensive range of meanings of the two terms. Philip Joseph 
identifies seven distinct usages of the term ‘rule of law’ and devotes over 50 pages to discussion of the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty: Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2007) at chs 6 and 14. 
16  The partial exception being the “reserved provisions” protected by s 268 of the Electoral Act 1993. The “reserved 
provisions” relate to the holding of regular elections, and can only be amended or repealed by either a 75 per cent majority 
in the House of Representatives, or a majority of votes on a poll of electors. Section 268 itself though is not similarly 
protected. 
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III  On Leadership in the Judicial Context 
While not the focus of this article, an article about the office of CJ requires a brief word about the concept 
of leadership in the judicial context. The way leadership is conceived of, and operates, in the judicial 
sphere must have a distinct quality and entail “leading” in a way somehow different from leadership 
generally. Speaking in broad terms, at the heart of the general conception of leadership is the notion of 
the leader being in charge, of being able to command, to say this is what we shall do and require it be 
done.17 The notion of leadership as command sits ill in the judicial context, or at least must be 
significantly modified, running as it does into obvious conflict with the constitutional imperatives of 
judicial independence and impartiality, and the requirements of collegiality. As Dame Sian put it to the 
House of Lords in 2004:18 
 
I am concerned about getting the balance right between not going too far in terms of managerial justice, and 
I am nervous about the Chief Justice acquiring statutory powers in relation to other judges because I think 
independence of the judiciary to achieve impartiality depends also on independence from judicial 
management … . 
 
In relation to purely “managerial” functions, (for example, matters of building maintenance, resource 
allocation, and management of the administrative systems), vis a vis a CJ’s court (or courts for which they 
are responsible), it may be that they manage in the command sense. Even in this field though, a wise CJ 
works collegially; the current CJ puts it this way: “the view I take is that the Chief Justice operates with 
the consent of the [other] judges [of the Court]”.19 A similar view is expressed by Winkelmann J, the 
Chief High Court Judge:20 
 
A feature of most judicial leadership is that it is based on building a consensus. Judicial leaders do not 
typically adopt a dictatorial style of leadership. ... I must bring others with me, to convince and persuade 
that the issues and solutions are as I propose. 
 
Judicial leadership might best be thought of as a matter not just of the individual (though it certainly starts 
there), but also a collective endeavour (hence the link on top courts to the concept of collegiality); a 
delicate balance between collaboration and individual initiative (far more so than leadership in other 
contexts). Chief Justice John Roberts of the United States Supreme Court recounts advice he received 
about holding the reins of power on a top court: “don’t hold them too tightly lest you find they’re no 
longer attached to anything”.21 In the case of the CJ of New Zealand, only in relation to the constitutional 
guardian and statesperson role does the holder have real scope for individual initiative — though even 
there holders will be aware that their authority is supported by, and sits within the context of, being the 
one judge at the apex of a relatively small cadre of judicial officers. 
                                                 
17  See also discussion in Kyela Leakey “The Role of the Chief Justice in Commonwealth Africa: a comparative study of South 
Africa, Ghana and Kenya (Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Queen Mary, University of 
London, 2012), at 29–30. 
18 Minutes of Evidence, above n 11, at Q 1034. 
19 At Q 1060. 
20  Helen Winkelmann “Promoting Innovative Leadership and the Role of Leadership in Planning Innovation” (paper presented 
to Asia Pacific Courts Conference, Auckland, 8 March 2013) at [16]. 
21  It is a line the Roberts CJ  is fond of, see for e.g., at 6’10” to 6’25” of his 2012 Centennial Lecture at Rice 
University: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UxaFhJ8JVq8.  
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IV  Chief Justices and the Office of Chief Justice — 1841–2013 
The office has been, and continues to be, in part defined by the approaches of each of its holders. As Peter 
Fish notes in his study of the office of CJ of the United States, “Chiefs have possessed different interests 
and skills; they have consequently perceived their roles in various ways.”22 In the New Zealand context, 
Geoffrey Palmer writes, “Each Chief Justice carries out the duties of the office in a distinctive way, and 
few leave it without making a distinctive mark on it”.23 And so, while this is not a work of legal history, 
historical writing and other documents concerning the office since 1841 provide essential context. 
New Zealand’s first CJ, William Martin, arrived in New Zealand on August 9, 1841.24 He travelled 
out with William Swainson (the colony’s second Attorney-General) and Thomas Outhwaite (who would 
be the first Registrar of the Supreme Court). 25 During the voyage the three men prepared the ordinances 
and initial procedures for the new Court.26 A few days before the Christmas of 1841 the Legislative 
Council passed the ordinance establishing the Supreme Court. The new Court would be “holden before 
one Judge, who shall be called the Chief Justice”, and to the Court there would “belong” a registrar.27 Just 
over a year later, in the third week of February 1842, in a court house on Queen Street, Auckland, near the 
southern corner of Victoria Street West, CJ Martin opened the first sitting (a murder trial) of what we now 
recognise as the High Court of New Zealand.28 
Since those events, and counting current holders, New Zealand has had 16 Governors, 20 Governors-
General,29 and 38 Premiers or Prime Ministers.30 Dame Sian Elias, who was appointed to the office in 
1999 (having joined the High Court bench in 1995) is only the twelfth person to hold the office of CJ 
(brief details of the holders of the office to date are contained in the appendix). Dame Sian’s eleven 
predecessors were in office for an average of 13 years, with Sir Robert Stout holding the unlikely to be 
beaten record of 27 years as the longest serving, and his immediate successor, Sir Charles Skerrett, the 
shortest serving at only 3 years. As of 2013 Dame Sian has been in office 14 years, and, unless the current 
retirement age of 70 is changed again, may serve until 2019.31 If she does — by then reaching 20 years in 
the post — she will be the third longest serving CJ in the nation’s history, (behind Sir Robert Stout (27 
years), and Sir James Prendergast (24 years)).32 
                                                 
22  Peter G Fish “The Office of Chief Justice of the United States: Into the Federal Judiciary’s Bicentennial Decade” in The 
Office of Chief Justice (White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs, Charlottesville, 1984) at 15. 
23  Geoffrey Palmer “Retirement of Rt Hon Sir Ronald Davison, GBE, CMG” [1989] NZLJ 84. 
24  G P Barton “Martin, William” (30 October 2012) Te Ara:  the Encyclopedia of New Zealand <www.teara.govt.nz>. 
25  Barton, above n 24.  
26  Barton, above n 24. 
27  Ordinance for establishing a Supreme Court 1841 5 Vict 1, cls 8 and 10. 
28 “The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal: Their First Beginnings” [1938] NZLJ 233 at 234. 
29  The Earl of Liverpool is counted under both heads, having served as Governor (1912–1917) and as Governor-General 
(1917–1920); prior to becoming Governor in 1841, Captain William Hobson had served as Lieutenant Governor during the 
Dependency during 1840–1841. Information from: “Former Governors-General” The Governor-General 
<www.gg.govt.nz>. 
30  Ministry for Culture and Heritage “Biographies — Premiers and Prime Ministers” (20 December 2012) New Zealand 
History Online <www.nzhistory.net.nz>. 
31  The Judicature Amendment Act 2007 raised the retirement age from 68 to 70 years. In the UK there has been pressure to 
raise the age from 70 to 75. 
32  A NZ Herald profile of Elias CJ in 2005 reported that Dame Sian had said on her appointment to the office that she “saw it 
as a 10-year position”. See “Elias — top judge and judicial activist” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 28 
March 2005). 
  
7 
 
The office in general has always been understood as having a broad remit— one likely to bring its 
holder into contention with members of the legislature. On the appointment of Sir Richard Wild in 1966, 
the NZ Law Journal wrote:33 
 
The Chief Justice controls the administration of the superior Courts of this country, and in a broad sense, his 
standards become the standards of those Courts. He is responsible for the harmonious working of the 
judicial machine and the allocation of work. … Both as Judge and Administrator [of the Government in the 
Governor General’s absence] he must be completely detached from and above all political polemics. He, 
and the other Judges, too, may, and on occasions must, express views critical of the activities of 
politicians.” 
 
The 1978 Royal Commission on the Courts described the office this way: 
 
Traditionally, the Chief Justice has also been spokesman for the judiciary in relation to the Government; the 
person regarded throughout the country as head of the judiciary, able to keep in close touch with the public 
and the legal profession because of his wide-ranging duties both as an administrator and as a judge of first 
instance, especially in major criminal trials.34 
 
To fulfil the role of CJ the 1978 Commission listed these necessary qualities later in its report: 
 
… a Chief Justice must have both legal and administrative ability, coupled with qualities of leadership. He 
must also have close knowledge of and contact with, the New Zealand community and the legal 
profession.35 
 
As noted above, between 1958 and 2003 there was a lack of clarity as to who, within New Zealand, was 
the nation’s top jurist: the CJ? Or the President of the Court of Appeal? Lord Cooke of Thorndon 
described the relationship between CJ and President as “an awkward one calling for tact by the holders of 
the respective offices”.36 At times the relationship ran smoothly; at others it descended into tension and 
pettiness. Speaking about the poor conditions the Court of Appeal worked under until the current building 
was opened in 1980, Sir Thaddeus McCarthy said that on becoming President in 1973 he:37 
 
… immediately took up issue with the Chief Justice and the Department. The Chief Justice was not 
prepared to help. Relations between the Court of Appeal and him (Wild CJ) had become somewhat strained. 
That did not help. 
 
                                                 
33  “The New Chief Justice” [1966] NZLJ 79 at 80. 
34  Royal Commission on the Courts Report of Royal Commission on the Courts, 1978 (Government Printer, Wellington, 1978) 
at [303]. 
35  At [672]. See also Law Commission The Structure of the Courts (NZLC R7, 1989) at [541]. 
36  Interview of Sir Robin Cooke by Peter Spiller (28 May 1993) quoted in Peter Spiller “Judges at work: The New Zealand 
Court of Appeal (1958–1976)” (1993) Waikato L Rev 79 at 92. See also Peter Spiller, Jeremy Finn and Richard Boast A 
New Zealand Legal History (1st ed, Brookers, Wellington, 1995) at 222. 
37 Thaddeus McCarthy “Memorandum on Circumstances Surrounding the Erection of the Court of Appeal Building in Aitken 
Street” in Rick Bigwood (ed) The Permanent New Zealand Court of Appeal: Essays on the First 50 Years (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2009) 355 at 356. 
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Chief Justice Wild regarded the Court of Appeal judges as coming within his beck and bailiwick. 
According to Peter Spiller the tension was a factor in McCarthy P’s decision to retire early.38 
Sir Richard’s successor, Sir Ronald Davidson was more emollient towards the Court of Appeal: “He 
believed that the Court of Appeal should not have two ‘bosses’, and therefore sat only when needed and 
otherwise left the Court to develop its own policies under its President.”39 And in turn, his successor, Sir 
Thomas Eichelbaum took the same approach; though with the advent of the Criminal Appeal Division in 
1991 Sir Thomas sat at the appellate level rather more often as the practice developed that the CJ would 
lead at that level on criminal matters.40 By 1994 the Appeal Division, sitting in Auckland, Christchurch, 
and Dunedin (in addition to Wellington), was hearing 75 per cent of criminal appeals, with the CJ 
frequently presiding.41 
Ending Privy Council appeals and creating a New Zealand Supreme Court required addressing the 
CJ/President issue. The Report of the Advisory Group, Replacing the Privy Council, a New Supreme 
Court in 2002 concluded that the CJ should sit in the new Supreme Court and “continue to have the 
responsibilities of upholding judicial independence, managing the relationship between the judicial and 
other branches of government and providing leadership”.42 The Justice and Electoral Select Committee 
which undertook detailed scrutiny of the Supreme Court Bill implicitly endorsed that conclusion.43 The 
Supreme Court Act 2003 thus brought clarity by placing the CJ in the Supreme Court and declaring the 
CJ head of the New Zealand judiciary.44 To relieve the CJ of her management responsibilities in relation 
to the High Court bench, the Act also created a new position of Chief Judge of the High Court.45 
I turn then to my first aim: mapping the extent of the office as it exists today. I divide the range of 
functions of the office of CJ into three areas: CJ as Supreme Court judge; CJ as judicial branch leader; 
and CJ as constitutional guardian and statesperson. We might think of the three sets of roles as three 
concentric circles, the outline of each radiating out from 85 Lambton Quay. 
A The Chief Justice as Supreme Court judge 
Before the 2003 reform CJs mainly sat in the High Court (with, as noted, occasional responsibility for 
appellate work); with the advent of the Supreme Court they only sit in that court. And when the Supreme 
Court sits they take the central seat. The CJ is the presiding judge with “seniority over the other Judges of 
the Supreme Court”;46 in her absence the next most senior judge stands in. 47 Acting Judges may only sit 
in the Supreme Court with her authorisation.48 The Chief chairs conferences between the justices where 
they discuss cases; she also oversees the management of the Court (assisted by the Court’s Registrar and 
other administrative staff). Emphasising in management matters the collegial nature of the Court, all its 
                                                 
38  Spiller, above n 36, at 93 and 95. 
39  Spiller, Finn and Boast, above n 36, at 222 citing Davison CJ. 
40  “Chief Justice: Interview with Mr Justice Eichelbaum on 12 January 1989” [1989] NZLJ 47 at 56. 
41  Spiller, Finn and Boast, above n 36, at 224. 
42  Report of the Advisory Group — Replacing the Privy Council: A New Supreme Court (Office of the Attorney-General, 
Wellington, 2002) at [95]–[105]; available at <www.crownlaw.govt.nz >. See also discussion in Law Commission, above n 
35, at [542] and [544]. 
43  Report of the Justice and Electoral Select Committee on the Supreme Court Bill (NZ Parliament, 2003), see 
discussion at pp33-35.  
44  Section 18. 
45  Judicature Act 1908, s 4B. 
46  Supreme Court Act 2003, s 18(1). 
47  Sections 29 and 19. 
48  Section 23. 
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judges sit on the Management Committee where they are also joined by Ministry of Justice 
representatives. That committee “routinely considers a Registrar’s report and an update report from the 
Ministry on projects affecting the Court”.49 The Registrar of the New Zealand Supreme Court, like similar 
officers throughout the system, is appointed under the State Services Act 1988. While there are policies in 
place intended to protect judicial independence, and while on a day to day basis he or she works for the 
Court, the Registrar is ultimately responsible to the Minister.50 This is a significant systemic weakness.51 
In contrast, the Chief Executive of the United Kingdom Supreme Court — a member of the Court’s 
leadership trio — is the choice of the Court’s President, and all administrative staff at the Court (judicial 
assistants excepted — they report to their assigned judge) are responsible to the Chief Executive and not 
the Minister of the Justice.52 
The role of presiding judge also brings with it the potential for a subtle, but potentially significant, 
degree of additional sway over the court’s work and jurisprudential direction. In his study of the Law 
Lords, Alan Paterson records Lord Denning’s view of the presider: “he conducts the argument”.53 He is 
the “individual with potentially the greatest influence on the oral exchange” able to “exercise considerable 
influence over the course of the argument to be presented in court.” I do not propose to examine in-court 
jurisprudential leadership (“thought leadership” as one English appellate judge described it to me) within 
the confines of this article.54 It is a complex issue requiring more detailed treatment than is possible here. 
First, in the New Zealand context there is the complication that between 1958 and 2003 the Presidents of 
the Court of Appeal, given that they sat far more frequently at the appellate level, were better placed to 
exercise jurisprudential leadership. Second, jurisprudential leadership is something any judge on a multi-
member court may aspire too, either generally, or in relation to particular topics. It is not the exclusive 
purview of the lead judge by virtue of their office. Third, it may also be something which members of the 
court explicitly allow to move around depending on the nature of the case before the court.55 Fourth, how 
(and perhaps even more importantly, when) does one measure it? Simply calculating the percentage of 
times the CJ leads the majority, as opposed to being in the minority, only tells us about the balance of 
judicial thought on the Court at discrete moments in time. Such calculations also tend to assume that a 
judge’s jurisprudential influence can usefully be judged in quantitative terms. Even one seminal judgment 
could come to be far more significant than a series of lesser remembered wins. Or it could be that a 
judge’s dissents come to be the lasting influence on future cases.56 Certainly a high number of judgments 
in the majority must tell us something, but quality and longevity also need to be considered. Before even 
getting to the task of assessment then, measuring in-court jurisprudential leadership poses challenging, 
potentially article-length, questions of methodological concern. 
                                                 
49  See Courts of New Zealand “Judicial Committees” <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
50  Supreme Court Act 2003, s 36. 
51  I emphasise this is a criticism of the system, not in any way its current administrative staff. 
52  See Richard Cornes “Gains (and Dangers of Losses) in Translation — The Leadership Function in the United Kingdom’s 
Supreme Court, Parameters and Prospects” [2011] PL 509, especially at 516–518. The position of Chief Executive was 
placed directly in the hands of the President of the Court by s 29(1) of the Crimes and Courts Act 2013 (UK); previously it 
was an appointment of the Minister of Justice in consultation with the Court’s President. 
53  Alan Paterson The Law Lords (MacMillan, London, 1982) at 66. 
54  Lady Justice Arden, Court of Appeal England & Wales, in conversation. 
55  Lord Hope, formerly Deputy President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, and one of its Scottish jurisdiction members 
has said “in appeals which raise issues of Scots Law … Lord Bingham used to say … if the two Scots [are] agreed, who [am 
I] to stand in their way”: Lord Hope “Taking the case to London — maybe it’s not over after all” (Annual Lecture 2010, 
Edinburgh Centre for Commercial Law, Edinburgh, 12 March 2010). 
56  One famous example may suffice: Lord Atkin in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 (HL). 
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B The Chief Justice as judicial branch leader 
The second cluster of functions concerns the CJ’s management and leadership role in relation to the 
judicial function beyond the Supreme Court. There are seven facets to the role. 
(1) Judicial system management and interface with the Ministry of Justice 
Since the 2003 reform Chief Justices no longer have day-to-day responsibilities for the management of 
the High Court. That task rests with the Chief High Court Judge who “is responsible to the Chief Justice 
for ensuring the orderly and prompt conduct of the High Court’s business”.57 The Law Commission’s 
2012 report on a new Courts Act recommended that a similar formal line of responsibility be noted in 
statute in respect of the role of the President of the Court of Appeal.58 The Commission also noted that, as 
“the Head of the Judiciary, the Chief Justice would have the ability to engage with the Chief District 
Court Judge”,59 to whom, in turn, the Principal Judges of that Court would be responsible. 
In relation to the interface with the Ministry of Justice, the system of judicial committees which assist 
in running the courts is described on the Courts of New Zealand website.60 The CJ will participate in 
Heads of Bench meetings which “are an important forum for developing positions from which the 
judiciary engages with the Executive”.61 Heads of Bench discussions feed into the Courts Executive 
Committee which oversees the administration of courts throughout the country, and reports to the 
Minister for Courts (one of the three “justice sector” ministers; the Minister of Justice and Attorney-
General being the other two). To assist the CJ in all her tasks, the office has an attachment of five staff in 
addition to those allocated to other members of the Supreme Court: a judicial administration officer, 
financial administrator, personal officer, communications advisor, two law clerks (the other judges have 
one each), and an associate (all judges have one associate providing general secretarial support). 62 These 
arrangements have been under review during 2013. At the time of writing that review had got to the point 
of contemplating a new judicial office for the higher courts, which would cover the CJ, President of the 
Court of Appeal and Chief High Court Judge. 
(2) Judicial system design 
Since 1841, CJs have played a role in influencing design of New Zealand’s court system. A few select 
examples illustrate the point. As noted above, the first CJ played a role in drafting the ordinance 
establishing what we now know as the High Court. Sir James Prendergast, the third holder of the office 
(1875–1899), oversaw significant reform of the judicial system contained in the Supreme Court Act and 
Court of Appeal Act, both of 1882.63 Sir Robert Stout’s period in office encompassed the consolidation of 
the earlier statutes governing the courts into the Judicature Act 1908 which,64 pending consideration of 
                                                 
57  Judicature Act, ss 4A and 4B. 
58  See recommendation 35 of Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act (NZLC R126, 
2012) at 195. 
59  At [8.7]. 
60  Courts of New Zealand, above n 49. 
61  Courts of New Zealand, above n 49. 
62  The Chief District Court Judge has a similar office complement and interacts with the higher courts administration via 
Heads of Bench meetings. 
63  Spiller, Finn and Boast, above n 36, at 194 
64  Dunn and Richardson record he carried out “monumental work in connection with the consolidation of the statutes of NZ in 
1908”: Waldo Dunn and Ivor Richardson Sir Robert Stout: A Biography (A H & A W Reed, Wellington, 1961) at 167. 
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the Law Commission’s 2012 report on a new Courts Bill,65 remains the central statute of the superior 
courts. Sir Michael Myers promoted the expansion of an appellate criminal jurisdiction with the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1945.66 Sir Michael’s successor, Sir Humphrey O’Leary, is recalled under this head for 
impeding reform rather than furthering it; however, the power to stop reform is just as significant an 
indicator of the sway of a CJ’s views. Of him, Spiller, Finn and Boast write: “He was an innately 
conservative man, and it was partly his strong opposition to the proposals presented for the establishment 
of a Court of Appeal that caused this to be postponed.”67 In contrast the next CJ, Sir Humprey 
Barrowclough, is credited with leading the bench to finally support the creation, in 1958, of a permanent 
Court of Appeal.68 
Chief Justice Wild supported the establishment in 1976 of the Beattie Royal Commission on the 
Courts which would lead, after its report in 1978, to a substantial revision of New Zealand’s court 
structure (including the transformation of magistrates’ courts into District Courts, and the Supreme Court 
into the High Court).69 Peter Spiller records that the Commission’s task “accorded with Wild CJ’s 
views”.70 Chief Justice Eichelbaum oversaw innovations in case management in the High Court, the 1994 
pilot project to televise courts, and the abolition of wigs in 1995.71 Sir Thomas was also an articulate 
advocate of increasing the courts’ administrative autonomy, reasoning that doing so was necessary to 
better secure judicial independence in New Zealand.72 What he described as the half-way house of a 
Department for Courts separate from the Ministry of Justice, came into being during his term of office in 
1995. His implicit characterisation of that reform as insufficient to truly insulate court administration 
from the wider priorities and needs of the justice sector was shown to be prescient when Trevor Mallard, 
then Minister for State Services announced, in 2003, that the Department for Courts would be merged 
back into the Ministry of Justice. This reform was announced with no serious prior consultation with the 
judiciary.73 
(3) Coordinating judicial input on bills affecting the courts and judiciary 
We have seen in the previous section that CJs have played a pro-active macro-level role in court system 
design. Another aspect of the office is to collate and present the views of the judiciary on legislative 
proposals which affect the operation of the courts and the judiciary. This is frequently done in writing, but 
also occasionally by appearing before parliamentary committees in person. Under this head the office 
holder acts in a notably collegial context, as the current CJ puts it: “[t]he Chief Justice does have an 
                                                 
65  Law Commission, above n 58. See also the Government’s response: Office of the Minister of Justice “Government response 
to the Law Commission’s report: Review of the Judicature Act 1908: towards a new Courts Act” (April 2013) Ministry of 
Justice <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
66  Spiller, Finn and Boast, above n 36, at 198. 
67  At 199. 
68  Peter Spiller New Zealand Court of Appeal 1958–1996: A History (Brookers, Wellington, 2002) at 3. The path to creation of 
the permanent Court (starting in 1907) is also recounted by Ivor Richardson in “The Permanent Court of Appeal: Surveying 
the 50 Years” in Rick Bigwood (ed) The Permanent Court of Appeal (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) 297 at 298–301. 
69  Spiller, Finn and Boast, above n 36, at 203. 
70  Peter Spiller “The Courts and the Judiciary” in Peter Spiller, Jeremy Finn and Richard Boast (eds) A New Zealand Legal 
History (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 187 at 216, n 190. 
71  Spiller, Finn and Boast, above n 36, at 206. 
72  Eichelbaum, above n 14. 
73  See Trevor Mallard, State Services Minister “Dept for Courts and Ministry of Justice to merge” (press release, 16 May 
2003). And see the closure report: Belinda Clark, Chief Executive of the Department of Courts Department for Courts 
Closure Report (Ministry of Justice, 2003). 
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obligation to consult the judiciary and to put up the views, including all the shades of view”.74 Some 
select examples, made available by the clerk of the Justice and Electoral Committee of Parliament, 
include: a two page submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee in 2009 on the Judicial Matters 
Bill 2008 (which amended the Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2004);75 submissions to the same 
Committee on the Search and Surveillance Bill in 2009 and 2010;76 a letter from the CJ, again to the 
Justice and Electoral Committee, concerning the Criminal Procedure Bill 2011 which opens noting that 
the Chief High Court Judge, President of the Court of Appeal and CJ had “been in correspondence with 
the Law Commission and the Ministry of Justice for some time concerning issues arising in the 
preparation” of the Bill;77 and finally a twelve page submission on the now defunct Pecuniary Interests of 
Judges Bill 2010.78 The level of engagement is notable, and represents a side of senior judicial duties 
which likely few members of the profession, let alone members of the public, are aware of. 
(4) Rules and court procedures 
At first glance the rules of court may be thought to be of subsidiary importance, not entailing an ability to 
affect substantive policy change in the judicial branch. That would be a mistaken view. Influencing the 
way courts operate, the way cases will be dealt with, has of course substantive effects on litigants. The 
main forum for rule-making is the Rules Committee, though scattered through legislation are other 
provisions that have a bearing on court operations and hearings.79 A review of the Rules Committee’s 
minutes from 2002 to 2013 reveals it deals with rather more than might be expected from its title: it also 
serves as a policy development body for courts from the District Court up.80 
The Committee comprises at least eleven members, six of whom are judges (the CJ, the Chief High 
Court Judge, two High Court judges appointed by the CJ, the Chief District Court Judge, and another 
District Court judge recommended by the Chief District Court Judge), while from the executive there is 
the Attorney-General (of the three justice sector ministers the one with the most significant expectation to 
be able to put his or her partisan concerns to one side) and Solicitor-General, and finally from the 
profession two lawyers nominated by the Law Society (and approved by the CJ).81 Additional persons 
                                                 
74  Minutes of Evidence, abone n 11, at Q 1063. 
75  Letter from Elias CJ to the Clerk of the Clerk of the Justice and Electoral Committee (24 February 2009). Copy on file with 
the author. 
76  Letter from Acting CJ Blanchard to the Clerk of the Justice and Electoral Committee (3 September 2010). Copy on file with 
the author. 
77  Letter from Elias CJ to the Clerk of the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee (24 February 2011). Copy on file with 
the author. 
78  Letter, and submission, from Acting CJ McGrath to the Clerk of the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee (30 August 
2012). Copy on file with the author. 
79  For example, the Judicature Act 1908, ss 51C, 51E and 51F (which concern conferral of jurisdiction on Registrars and 
Deputy Registrars — indicating their position as quasi-judicial officers, not simply administrative personnel); Criminal 
Records (Clean Slate) Act 2004, s 22; and Evidence Act 2006, s 30(6) (power to issue guidance as to when evidence 
improperly obtained may be admitted). 
80  The minutes are available at <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. A sense of the range of issues dealt with can be seen in for 
example, the minutes of the Committee’s meeting on 11 February 2013 where, inter alia, the concept of proportional dispute 
resolution was raised, at item 4; and a broad discussion of case management and hearing procedures, at item 10. 
81 Judicature Act 1908, s 51B(1). A list of current members is available at <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>, but Committee minutes 
show that non-members, such as Parliamentary Counsel staff, policy and operational representatives from the Ministry of 
Justice, and other judges often attend. 
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may be appointed by the CJ for special purposes to serve at her pleasure.82 Rules may be made by the 
Governor-General in Council with the concurrence of the CJ and any two or more members of the Rules 
Committee, at least one of whom must be a judge.83 A similar composition also serves the District Courts 
in respect of rule making.84 
That the judiciary though, with the CJ as head, has a lead role on policy making concerning court 
procedures is apparent in more than just the Judicature Act provisions and the practical effect of the Rules 
Committee’s work. Regulations made under the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 may also only be made 
with the concurrence of the CJ and Chief District Court Judge.85 Three acts contain specific additional 
powers for the CJ in relation to proceedings in which a court may be required to receive sensitive 
evidence. Under the Passport Act 1992, passports or travel documents may be denied or revoked.86 Where 
proceedings concerning those provisions involve classified security information a court may be required 
to deal with the matter in camera. The Act contains a back-up provision providing the CJ and Attorney-
General to put in place “general practices and procedures” to ensure that the provisions requiring 
protection of classified security information are implemented (for example, dealing with how classified 
information is provided to the court).87 Equivalent provisions in the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 and 
the Immigration Act 2009 serve a similar purpose.88 Also, under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Seas Act 1996, the CJ must concur in the making of any rules concerning the enforcement of 
decisions made under the Convention.89 Finally, the High Court is also available to Tokelau; the CJ may 
direct it sit for Tokelauan purposes either in Tokelau or elsewhere.90 
(5) Judicial appointments (including temporary appointments) 
In addition to the CJ’s role in relation to acting judges in the Supreme Court, she has a number of other 
functions concerning the appointment and placement of judges. In relation to appointments there has been 
a practice (not though one assiduously adhered to) of consulting the CJ on appointments to the High 
Court and above. The Law Commission in its 2012 report on a consolidated Courts Bill recommended 
that the consultation requirement should be set out in the new statute. That view has been rejected by the 
current Minister of Justice.91 
In relation to the placement and use of superior court judges, temporary or acting judges of the High 
Court may only be appointed if the CJ and Chief High Court Judge certify the appointment is “necessary 
                                                 
82  Judicature Act, s 51B(2). 
83  Section 51C. 
84  District Courts Act 1947, s 122(1) where jurisdiction is conferred by the District Courts Act 1947. See s 122(1A) where 
another Act conferrs jurisdiction. See also discussion at < 
http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/about/system/rules_committee/role_powers/#district>.  
85  Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 387(5). 
86  Passport Act 1992, ss 29AA, 29AB and associated sections referenced therein. 
87  Section 29AC. 
88  Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, s 40. Immigration Act 2009, s 260. 
89  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Act 1996, s 16. 
90  Tokelau Amendment Act 1986, s 3(3). 
91  See recommendation 17 of Law Commission, above n 58, at appendix 5. The Minister responded to the Commission’s 
proposal stating: “I do not support placing relatively detailed appointment criteria and consultation in primary legislation, as 
proposed by the Commission. Instead, after consultation with the Attorney-General, I propose a legislative requirement for 
the Attorney-General to produce public guidelines or protocols outlining the process to be followed when he or she solicits 
and advances judicial appointment recommendations to the Governor-General”, above n 65, at [31]. 
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for the due conduct of the court’s business” (a similar provision applies to temporary associate judges);92 
a supervisory judge (and assistants to that person) for the commercial list is named by the CJ after 
consultation with the Chief High Court Judge;93 the CJ is empowered to make arrangements with the CJ 
of the Federal Court of Australia trans-Tasman cooperation in certain matters under Part 1A of the 
Judicature Act 1908;94 and the CJ must certify High Court judges to sit on the Court of Appeal “except 
where the work of the High Court renders it impracticable” (both the President of the Court of Appeal and 
Chief High Court judge must be consulted, the latter of whom must also concur in the assignment).95 
Finally, the CJ, or her nominee must be consulted in relation to rules made concerning the operation of 
juries.96 
(6) The profession and bench: development, appointments and discipline 
Asked “Would you think that the office carries with it some degree of responsibility for being the liaison 
between the Judiciary as a whole and the organised profession?” Sir Thomas Eichelbaum in 1989 
responded: “That’s exactly the way I would see it.”97 In a range of ways CJs have been a fulcrum between 
the profession and the bench, with an auxiliary role, alongside others (the Presidents of the Law and Bar 
Societies, for example) as leaders of the legal profession (practitioners and judges). The removal of the CJ 
to the Supreme Court and introduction of the post of Chief High Court Judge did have the potential to 
reduce the CJ’s abilities here. That risk has been substantially addressed by the CJ regularly speaking out 
of court, and seeking out ways to engage with the profession and wider community (as discussed below in 
relation to the office’s constitutional guardian and statesperson role). 
The CJ nominates two judges to serve on the New Zealand Council of Legal Education, which 
amongst its other roles, sets the requirements for qualifying law degrees (a pre-requisite for admission to 
the bar in New Zealand).98 If the CJ chooses to take one of the judicial seats she also becomes the 
Council’s Chair.99 The CJ and Attorney-General have the power to issue guidelines as to the necessary 
qualifications and experience to become a QC, and the process by which QCs are appointed. Appointment 
as a QC requires the CJ’s concurrence with the Attorney-General, implicitly giving the CJ some influence 
over who might go on to be appointed to the bench;100 and 16 of the 37 High Court judges listed on the 
Courts of New Zealand website were QCs (or SCs) before appointment to the bench.101 The CJ’s statutory 
role in the appointment of QCs contrasts with the current lack of a formal consultation requirement in 
respect of appointments to the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court. 
Turning to the CJ’s role in relation to judicial discipline we have two recent examples. One occurred 
prior to the reform introduced by the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 
2004, and the other after. The first was the case of Justice Robert Fisher. In early 2001 it came to light 
                                                 
92  Judicature Act, ss 11, 11A, 11B and 26H(6)–26H(7). 
93  Sections 24C(1) and 24C(2). 
94  Section 56P. 
95  Sections 58A–58C. 
96  Juries Act 1981, s 35(2)(a). 
97  “Chief Justice: Interview with Mr Justice Eichelbaum on 12 January 1989”, above n 40, at 56. 
98  Lawyers and Conveyanacers Act 2006, s 282 sets out the Council’s membership. See <www.nzcle.org.nz> for the current 
make-up. 
99  Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, s 286(2). 
100  Section 119 and Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Queen’s Counsel) Regulations 2012, cls 4 and 5. For the 
guidelines see Crown Law Office “Queen’s Counsel — Guidelines for Candidates” (1 February 2013) 
<www.crownlaw.govt.nz>. 
101  Courts of New Zealand “The Judges of the High Court” <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
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that the judge had accessed pornographic websites from a computer provided to him by the Department 
for Courts. The matter had been dealt with by the CJ, who had not at the time informed the Attorney-
General. There had been no illegality, though it was reported that the judge had apologised to the CJ for 
what she described as a “lapse”.102 Television New Zealand reported that “when routine court checks on 
staff [in the Department for Courts, including judges] picked [up Fisher’s porn viewing] the chief justice 
was told.”103 The Fisher revelation prompted a further, “scan of court computers”, which “found that three 
more judges [had] logged onto sex sites.”104 The embarrassment of the conduct involved should not 
obscure the remarkable fact that agents of the Crown, a frequent litigant, were routinely monitoring IT 
equipment used by judicial officers and staff working directly for them. 
Without referencing the incident, Dame Sian alluded to this concern before the House of Lords in 
2004:105 
 
… I think we are at a position now in New Zealand where things are almost intolerable in terms of our 
direct judicial support and that it is time for us at least to take responsibility for our secretarial 
arrangements, our IT arrangements, the security of our officers and matters such as that because at the 
moment we are totally dependent on a Ministry of Justice. 
 
In the absence of criminal behaviour the constitutionally proper approach was clearly the path taken by 
Elias CJ. As to why she had not informed the Attorney-General, she is reported as saying: “I formed the 
view that it wasn’t a matter that needed to be relayed to her because it had been dealt with”.106 After 15 
years on the bench, Justice Fisher retired in 2004 to practise as an arbitrator.107 
Judicial discipline in New Zealand is now for the most part dealt with under the Judicial Conduct 
Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Act 2004.108 The position of Judicial Conduct Commissioner has 
obvious significance for the preservation of confidence in the judiciary and protection of judicial 
independence (by ensuring appropriate investigation only of complaints warranting investigation). The CJ 
must be consulted by the Attorney-General on the choice of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner.109 
After an initial investigation, complaints of sufficient seriousness (that is, complaints which if proven 
could justify removal of a judge from office) may give rise to a recommendation by the Commissioner to 
the Attorney-General to set up a judicial conduct panel.110 The Attorney-General must consult the CJ on 
the membership of any panel (though not as to whether a panel will be formed).111Complaints of lesser 
seriousness against a member of the Supreme Court would be referred to the CJ.112 
                                                 
102  Vernon Small, “Porn inquiry clears judge” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 20 February 2002). 
103  Television New Zealand “Top judge knew of porn viewing” (18 February 2002) <www.tvnz.co.nz>. 
104  Vernon Small “Four judges logged on to sex sites” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 19 February 2002). See 
also “Summary of reports to the AG etc 22/2/2002” (obtained through requests under the Official Information Act 1982). 
Copy on file with the author. 
105 Minutes of Evidence, above n 11, at Q1034. 
106  Television New Zealand, above n 103. 
107  See <www.robertfisher.co.nz>. 
108  See Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Committee Act 2004 and Office of the Judicial Conduct 
Commissioner <www.jcc.govt.nz>. 
109  Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Committee Act, ss 7(3) and 8A(3). 
110  Section 18. 
111  Section 21(2). If the complaint concerned the CJ herself the consultation is with the next most senior judge of the Court, s 
21(3). 
112  Section 17. 
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The Act was tested at the very highest level when misconduct complaints were laid against then 
Justice William Wilson of the Supreme Court in 2008 and 2009. One of the complainants was a former 
acting judge on the Court: Sir Edmund Thomas. 113 As the CJ had recused herself, the functions under the 
Act of her office were carried out by the next most senior judge on the Court, Justice Peter Blanchard. 
And as the matter was deemed serious enough to warrant recommendation of a judicial conduct panel 
investigation, Justice Blanchard’s formal involvement (aside from presiding in the crucial Saxmere 1 and 
Saxmere 2 cases)114 will have been restricted to being consulted on the membership of the panel.115 We 
may only speculate as to the nature of the CJ, and Acting CJ’s actions behind the scenes to protect the 
integrity of the Court, and to provide appropriate support to their colleague. 
(7) Miscellaneous administrative roles 
The CJ nominates a judge to the New Zealand Council of Law Reporting (which is responsible for the 
New Zealand Law Reports).116 One useful innovation a CJ could promote, via their nominee, would be a 
separate set of reports of Supreme Court decisions (both for decisions to refuse leave applications and 
substantive decisions). This would allow wider dissemination of the New Zealand Supreme Court’s 
decisions; such a series would be taken up by top court libraries elsewhere. Finally, if the Sentencing 
Council Act 2007 were given effect to the CJ would appoint four judges as part of the ten member 
Sentencing Council.117 
C The Chief Justice as constitutional guardian & statesperson 
Finally we come to the heading under which CJs enjoy the most extensive and personal scope of 
operation. Under the previous two heads CJs operate within relatively significant levels of collegial 
constraint. The constitutional guardian and statesperson role offers the incumbent, accentuated by the 
2003 reform, the most personal latitude for leadership on both the national and international stage. The 
constitutional guardian and statesperson role requires, inter alia, that the holder of the office speak 
publically not only on matters to do with the judiciary, but also more widely. Those elected to Parliament 
speak for New Zealanders’ three yearly, majoritarian passions. One responsibility of the CJ is to articulate 
the interests of our longer term constitutional selves — the people we like to (or at least should) imagine 
                                                 
113  See: Judicial Conduct Commissioner Decision of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner as to Three Complaints Concerning 
Justice Wilson (7 May 2010), available at <www.jcc.govt.nz>. 
114  Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35 [Saxmere No 1]; and Saxmere 
Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd (No 2) [2009] NZSC 122, [2010] 1 NZLR 76 [Saxmere No 2]. 
115  After Justice Wilson’s only partially successful challenge to the decisions to recommend and establish the panel before a 
Full Court of the High Court (Wilson v Attorney-General [2011] 1 NZLR 399) he resigned bringing the matter to an end (if 
not a conclusion). For a critique of the scheme’s performance see B V Harris, ”The Resignation of Wilson J: A Consequent 
Critique of the Operation of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004” [2011] NZ L Rev 
625. And see also Deborah Coddington’s post-resignation coverage “Exclusive: Justice Wilson speaks out” The New 
Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 24 October 2010). 
116  New Zealand Council of Law Reporting Act 1938, s 7. 
117  The Council’s role, purposes, and functions are set out in ss 7, 8 and 9 of the Sentencing Council Act 2007 respectively. The 
National Party has previously signalled it would scrap the Council: “National to scrap sentencing council” (2 August 2008) 
Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>. While the Act has been brought into effect (see Sentencing Council Act 2007 Commencement 
Order 2007, which provides a commencement date of 1 November 2007) no further action appears to have been taken to 
either repeal it or give effect to its provisions. 
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ourselves to be in our “most elevated and critical hour”.118 There are four components to this role. The 
first two relatively formally outlined; the last two rather more open to moulding by CJs from time to time. 
(1) Constitutional responsibilities 
Like her counterpart in Canada (though not Australia, where the role is taken by the most senior state 
governor), in the absence or incapacity of the Governor-General, the CJ stands in as Administrator of the 
Government, empowered by Letters Patent to carry out all the functions of the office of Governor-
General.119 This involves both ceremonial matters as well as presiding over the Executive Council. The 
distinction between her role as judge and administrator is even provided for by the keeping of an office in 
the Old Supreme Court building (attached to the modern Supreme Court building), separate from her 
judicial office. Also included under this sub-heading is the CJ’s role under the Electoral Act 1993, 
touching as it does on a matter of constitutional significance: the integrity of the electoral process. Under 
that Act the CJ chooses the three judges to hear electoral petitions.120 
(2) Trans-Tasman cooperation in judicial system governance 
Sir Thomas Eichelbaum played a role in the New Zealand CJ becoming a participating member of the 
Australia, New Zealand Council of CJs.121 In addition to this connection with Australia, the CJ also has 
the functions outlined above concerning trans-Tasman judicial cooperation.122 
(3) Constitutional player and statesperson 
Since the 1840s, CJs have played a role in relation to governance of the nation beyond the judicial sphere, 
providing a judicial perspective on matters beyond the operation of the judicial branch. In addition to 
setting up the Supreme Court, Sir William Martin “gave invaluable aid in preparing the first legislation of 
the colony”.123 Of such importance was the CJ’s wider role in governance of the new colony that on 
Martin CJ’s resignation, Henry Sewell “told the Colonial Office that a willingness to analyse draft 
legislation was a more important qualification for the new CJ than the ability to decide cases”. The second 
                                                 
118  From Henry David Thoreau: “Every man is tasked to make his life, even in its details, worthy of the contemplation of his 
most elevated and critical hour.” Henry David Thoreau A week on the Concord and Merrimack rivers; Walden, or Life in the 
Woods; The Maine woods; Cape Cod (Viking Press, New York, 1985) at 394. On the concept of our “constitutional selves” 
see also Christopher Eisgruber Constitutional Self-Government (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2001) 
especially at 49–52. 
119  Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand 2006, cl 12. While acting as Administrator the 
Chief Justice (or where applicable next most senior judge acting) continues to receive their judicial salary: Governor-
General Act 2010, s 15. 
120  Electoral Act 1993, s 235(1)–235(2). 
121  See the warmth of Michael Kirby’s tribute to Eichelbaum CJ, in which Kirby touched on the growing trans-Tasman 
cooperation in judicial matters: Justice Michael Kirby “An Australian Tribute to Chief Justice Eichelbaum” (speech given at 
Government House, Wellington, 15 May, 1999) available at <www.hcourt.gov.au>. 
122  See above n 94. 
123  Robin Cooke QC (ed) Portrait of a Profession (A H & A W Reed, Wellington, 1969) at 37. 
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CJ, George Arney (1857–1875), held a seat in the colony’s upper house, being appointed on his arrival.124 
Of his work in the Legislative Council, Ronald Jones writes:125 
 
In the Council he identified himself closely with the movement in the sixties for the fusion of law and 
equity, and it was largely as a result of his quiet but firm suasion that the Council in 1861 reaffirmed the 
resolution of 1856 whereby Judges held their commissions during the pleasure of Her Majesty or on an 
address from both Houses of Parliament. 
 
In his examination of the politics of the colonial constitution between 1840 and 1858, Ward suggests that 
“[i]n the absence of representative institutions, courtrooms could become arenas for political disputes 
over the way the colonial constitution did, and ought to, operate.”126 Establishing the institutions of the 
colony also engaged the judges in communicating their functions to the indigenous population. In the 
early 1840s the settler population was estimated to be 9,600, with Māori numbering approximately 
60,000.127 McKenzie notes that: 128 
 
Martin considered that in the early years of the colony the court had a pivotal role in demonstrating that 
there were real benefits in administering justice in an orderly and public way by an impartial judge and a 
jury in a society governed by the rule of law, over self-help forms of justice otherwise available to a frontier 
society. 
 
Chief Justice Martin framed his goals in part as a matter of persuading the “natives” of the benefit of the 
introduction of the new systems. He was, as McKenzie acknowledges, a mid-Victorian in outlook with 
assimilationist tendencies.129 
The first CJ was not just engaged in a colonisation project though, but also starting the cultivation of a 
distinctly New Zealand model of justice. The New Zealand historian Michael King might have 
encouraged us to view Martin and his early judicial colleagues as not just colonisers, but also as 
significant first pakeha (i.e., non- Māori New Zealanders) working to blend New Zealand’s newly 
imported British judicial traditions with South Pacific ones, and laying the basis for New Zealand’s “bi-
cultural reality”.130 The court system Martin helped create is the one which would go on to develop the 
distinct common law of New Zealand we acknowledge today.131 His efforts to explain the new system led 
to one of New Zealand’s first efforts at judicial public relations, with the preparation of a booklet 
explaining the new court system, in Maori and English.132 Sir William Martin was also an advocate, 
extra-curially, for Māori interests and respect for the Treaty of Waitangi, to the extent, according to 
                                                 
124  Damen Ward “Civil Jurisdiction, Settler Politics, and the Colonial Constitution, Circa 1840–58” (2008) 39 VUWLR 497 at 
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131  See for example Sian Elias, Chief Justice of New Zealand “‘Sailing in a new direction’: the laws of England in New 
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Barton, of “placing his judicial status in question” with his public criticism of Crown policy towards 
Māori.133 
Sir Robert Stout — the office’s fourth holder — was New Zealand’s first entirely home-grown CJ, 
having learnt the law in New Zealand and being first admitted to practice here. According to Dunn and 
Richardson (the latter a Court of Appeal judge from 1977 to 2002, and its President from 1996), he 
became “the embodiment of the law in its ideal form”.134 When appointed in 1899 he was already a 
national figure — “almost legendary” — having previously been Attorney-General, Minister of 
Education, Premier, and contender for leadership of the Liberal Party.135 While CJ, aside from being 
Administrator of the Government, he was Chairman of the Prisons Board from its inception in 1911 until 
his retirement in 1926. In 1907 and 1908, he served with Sir Apirana Ngata on the Native Lands and 
Native Land Tenure Commission (which became known as the Stout-Ngata Commission). Its work 
formed the basis for the Native Lands Act of 1909.136 
On matters of constitutional concern he was an early advocate of leaving the Privy Council: 137  
 
The present system is often a denial of justice to many litigants on account of delay, cost, and the ignorance 
of the external Judges of what our laws have been, and are, and of want of acquaintance with our 
environment. The psychological effect of dependence on some external power for the performance of our 
highest duties as citizens of these new nations should also not be lost sight of. 
 
Grant Morris calls Stout “one of the great New Zealanders”.138 Similarly, David Hamer writes that Stout’s 
various achievements made him “one of the most influential architects of a democratic New Zealand”.139 
Sir John Findlay, writing on the CJ’s retirement, and in prose which now reads as rather ebullient, but 
which captures a sense of the fourth CJ’s impact, compared Sir Robert to an 11th century crusader, or one 
of the passengers of the Mayflower — the theme being of a man who came to New Zealand in search of 
“wider liberty”.140 
Sir Michael Myers (1929–1946), who was close to Prime Minister Fraser, staked out a role for the CJ 
as international statesperson. In 1936, he was the first New Zealand born judge to sit on the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council.141 He participated in the post-World War Two conferences which led to 
the creation of the United Nations and International Court of Justice,142 for which on his retirement he 
was thanked effusively by Prime Minister Fraser:143 
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I feel impelled to refer also to the most valuable contribution made by you as the representative of New 
Zealand at the United Nations Committee of Jurists held in Washington during 1945, and subsequently at 
the San Francisco conference.  
 
Sir Richard Wild (1966–1978), the first Solicitor General to take the office of CJ, is recalled, inter alia, 
for the constitutionally significant decision in Fitzgerald v Muldoon, a decision resting in part on 
provisions of the Bill of Rights 1688.144 Spiller writes of him, “He was variously described as a larger-
than-life figure, the thirteenth man in the Cabinet, the best trade union representative for the judges, and a 
man with the gift of keeping a finger on the pulse of legal business throughout the country.”145 
(4) Speaking out of Court — extra-curial jurisprudential leadership 
As we have seen in a range of contexts, previous CJs have provided jurisprudential leadership by 
speaking outside their court. Chief Justice Elias has been active in the same vein, speaking to both 
domestic and international audiences. Since appointment a non-exhaustive list of topics she has spoken on 
(other than parliamentary sovereignty and sentencing policy, discussed in more detail below) includes: 
how law adapts to the needs of changing societies;146 the fragile understanding of civics and judicial 
independence in New Zealand;147 the evolution of distinct New Zealand legal principles;148 judicial 
independence and administration;149 women’s rights in international and domestic contexts;150 gender 
issues in legal systems;151 the developing grounds of review in administrative law;152 and the rights of 
indigenous peoples.153 My focus though is on two areas that have caused notable friction in New 
Zealand’s hyper-partisan, highly democratically efficient system. The first involved an exchange between 
Dame Sian and Michael Cullen on the nature of parliamentary sovereignty; the second involved an 
exchange between Dame Sian and Simon Power as Minister of Justice on sentencing policy. 
First, in the spirit of explaining the constitution, the CJ has spoken a number of times, and from a 
range of perspectives, about the relationship between the branches of government, and in particular the 
respective limits of authority of the legislature and courts. In March 2003 she spoke on the theme of 
“sovereignty” at the Institute for Comparative and International Law at the University of Melbourne.154 In 
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July 2003, she spoken on related matters in her FW Guest Memorial Lecture at Otago University,155 
which was followed by her December Robin Cooke Lecture, “Something Old, Something New: 
Constitutional Stirrings and the Supreme Court”.156 Running through these pieces is a theme familiar to 
constitutional lawyers: the balance of responsibilities between legislatures and courts, with the specific 
New Zealand/United Kingdom leitmotif of the Diceayan notion of Parliamentary Sovereignty. The CJ’s 
take on that doctrine in the modern New Zealand context resonates with the writings of eminent jurists 
elsewhere, including the judicial and extra-judicial writings of the late Lord Cooke.157 While 
acknowledging that “Parliament is supreme as legislator”, she also notes that it “legislates under the law 
of the constitution”, and that saying what the constitution is, is “ultimately for the courts. … 
Parliamentary sovereignty is an inadequate theory of our constitutions. An untrammelled freedom of 
Parliament does not exist.”158 
The following May, in a special sitting of the House of Representatives on the 150th anniversary of the 
sitting of a New Zealand legislature, the Deputy Prime Minister (and soon to be Attorney-General), 
Michael Cullen, responded:159 
 
There is an increasing tendency to challenge the exercise of [Parliament’s] sovereignty. … [The challenge] 
also comes from within the heart of New Zealand’s judiciary. Our own Chief Justice has put it in three key 
statements. Firstly, we have assumed the application of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in New 
Zealand — why, is not clear. Secondly, whether there are limits to the lawmaking power of the New 
Zealand Parliament has not been authoritatively determined, which raises the interesting question of who 
has the authority to determine that. Thirdly, an untrammelled freedom of Parliament does not exist. … 
[This] is not a view that I accept. 
 
Speaking in 2011 of s 3(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003’s reference to a continuing commitment to the 
rule of law and sovereignty of parliament the CJ implicitly returned to the issue, saying: “The sovereignty 
of Parliament is shadowed by the rule of law.”160 
The exchange between the CJ and Michael Cullen was a healthy example of two constitutional 
officers, each speaking respectfully from the perspective of their own branch, articulating two distinct 
constitutional perspectives. Recall the setting of Michael Cullen’s response: the 150th anniversary of a 
legislature. This was a setting for deep politics, beyond the surface froth of partisan debate. A leading 
member of the legislature was speaking for the constitutional interests of the legislative branch 
(irrespective of the current partisan balance) challenging the perspective of the lead member of the 
judicial branch. This is, I suggest, an entirely beneficial exchange of views (of such do we draw the 
elements of our unwritten constitution), and to be contrasted to the testy reaction of a Minister of Justice, 
Simon Power, to the CJ, considered next. While there was clearly some consternation within the elected 
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branch over the CJ’s views on parliamentary sovereignty, there was no message sent to the CJ to not even 
speak on matters of constitutional concern. 
My second example comes from 2009 on the topic of sentencing policy. Delivering the annual Shirley 
Smith Address (for the Women in the Law Committee of the Wellington Branch of the Law Society), the 
CJ addressed the problem of managing the prison population. She opened that part of her address by 
noting that other countries used executive amnesties to release prisoners early in order to avoid over-
crowding. Specifically acknowledging that she was not in a position to assess such a policy’s feasibility, 
she raised executive amnesties as an issue which warranted consideration. The Minister of Justice (backed 
up by the Prime Minister) responded with the line that the CJ had exceeded the scope of her role. Simon 
Power was reported as saying, “This is not government policy. The Government was elected to set 
sentencing policy, judges are appointed to apply it.”161 
Aside from the fact that it has been understood in Britain and New Zealand since at least the 1970s 
that the courts do make law when deciding cases, the Minister’s reaction (while understandable) failed to 
respect one of the functions of the office of CJ. His reaction also raised the danger of the CJ’s speech 
becoming the subject of narrative hijack — where the story is taken up not to cover the policy exchange, 
but (and of more interest to the media) to play into an easily understood narrative of “elected politicians v 
unelected judges”.162 The CJ was simply putting forward one view to be taken into account with others on 
a matter of significant public policy concern. Lead judges elsewhere do this regularly. Consider, for 
example the President of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in 2013 speaking critically of government 
cuts to legal aid, an area of high and live current partisan debate. The executive may have been chagrined, 
but it did not react by suggesting the very act of the President speaking on the matter was somehow 
improper.163 
V  Conclusions — Stability, Scope, Prominence 
A Chief Justices as a point of stability in the nation’s life 
Of all the lead constitution positions, Monarchs aside, CJs have to date spent the longest time in post. The 
longest serving premier, Sir Richard Seddon (who defeated Sir Robert Stout to become leader of the 
Liberal Party, and then Premier in 1893) only managed 13 years in the post.164 Thirteen years, it will be 
recalled, is the average term of office of the 11 CJs to date. Dame Sian is now in her 15th year. New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements include few embedded checks or fetters on the elected branch. 
There is no entrenched constitution, no second chamber, no federal system, and no recourse to a court like 
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the European Court of Human Rights.165 The New Zealand political system, with its three yearly election 
cycle, and a fairly lacklustre media (with a handful of honourable exceptions which it would be invidious 
to name), lives life fast. Chief Justices provide an important point of stability and continuity in the 
nation’s public life. 
B Scope of the office — complexity and range 
This article has not provided a quantitative or qualitative analysis of CJs’ performance as in-court 
jurisprudential leaders. That is not meant to indicate that in-court jurisprudential leadership is not a topic 
worth considering. I have not considered it in depth in this article for two reasons. As already noted, it 
clearly requires the space of a separate article (or for that matter, monograph). But second, and more 
substantively, the first of my two aims was to bring out the complexity and range of the functions of the 
CJ. Certainly, deciding cases is one of a CJ’s central responsibilities; but an accurate view of the office 
requires that we see that as just one of a wide range of functions attaching to the role. Only from that 
wider view could we embark on a fair evaluation of the relative performance of CJs over time. Finally, as 
a very practical matter, failing to comprehend the wide range of calls on a CJ’s time could lead to under-
resourcing of the office. And that would be to the detriment of maintaining a healthy balance within New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements. 
C A role of enhanced prominence and importance post-2003 
I opened recalling my 2004 hypothesis that “[t]he leadership role of the Chief Justice will be emphasised 
— in relation to both the Supreme Court itself and to the judicial branch in general.”166 The above review 
of the CJs functions, especially the relatively high profile engagements between the current holder and 
members of the elected branch, bear out that hypothesis. Placing the head of the judiciary in her own 
court, and making that court the final court of appeal for the country has enhanced the prestige of the 
office. 
To a significant extent comment about the office over the last decade or so has focused on the 
character of its current holder. While that is understandable — after all, as noted, the office will be 
moulded by its holders from time to time — we should not lose sight of the fact that Dame Sian, her 
predecessors, and successors, are performing a constitutional role. They are bound to carry out all of the 
functions of the office as outlined above; MPs especially need to realise that CJs do not have agendas of 
the partisan kind that enliven the world of politicians. When CJs speak on matters of policy, even 
contradicting the view of the MPs or ministers, they do so because it is their role to provide that distinct, 
judicial perspective, not because they are providing yet another party political view. 
Finally,  particularly in relation to the constitutional guardian and statesperson role, CJs can play a 
role in helping to build broader public understanding of the judicial role and the benefits to the 
community of judicial independence. Regarding that role, the current CJ said this to the House of Lords in 
2004:167 
 
One of the things that I hope we will achieve with our Supreme Court is better visibility of the place 
occupied by the courts in the system … It is interesting to look at the extent to which the High Court of 
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Australia is appreciated even when its decisions are disagreed with. There is a sense that the community is 
proud of their constitution. I hope that the visibility of the final Court will aid a public understanding of the 
balances in the constitution, but at the moment I think there is a lot of ignorance in New Zealand. 
 
A more clearly identifiable single head of the judicial branch may well not be a comfortable addition to 
public debate for ministers from time to time, but it is one which all New Zealanders should welcome.  
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Appendix — Chief Justices of New Zealand168 
 
 Holder Term Place of 
birth 
Education Select professional 
background 
1 Sir William 
Martin 
1842–
1857 
Birmingham
, England 
King Edward VI 
Grammar, Birmingham; 
BA, MA, Cambridge 
Called (Lincoln’s Inn) 1836; 
drafting and conveyancing practice 
before being appointed New 
Zealand’s first CJ. 
2 Sir George 
Arney 
1857–
1875 
Salisbury, 
England 
Classics, Oxford Called (Lincoln’s Inn) 1829; 
practicing barrister. 
3 Sir James 
Prendergast 
1875–
1899 
London, 
England 
Cambridge Schoolmaster after graduation, 
then travelled to the Australian 
goldfields before returning to 
England to study law and gaining 
admission to the bar; 1862 arrived 
New Zealand to practice law in 
Dunedin; Crown Solicitor Otago, 
1865; Attorney-General 1865–
1876; first President of the Law 
Society when formed in 1870. 
4 Rt Hon Sir 
Robert Stout 
1899–
1926 
Shetland 
Islands, 
Scotland 
Shetlands Having arrived aged 19 in 
Dunedin initially worked as a 
surveyor before becoming a school 
teacher, then articled clerk in 
1867, admitted to the Bar, 1871. 
Otago University’s first law 
lecturer. 1878 Attorney-General. 
1884–1887 Premier. Remained in 
national politics until appointment 
as CJ. 
5 Sir Charles 
Skerrett 
1926–
1929, 
though ill 
India, family 
emigrated to 
New 
Wellington College. Post Office, Treasury, clerk 
Wellington Magistrates Court, 
then admitted to the Bar in 1884.  
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for much 
of at 
least 
1928, 
dying in 
office in 
Feb., 
1929. 
Zealand 
when he was 
12. 
6 Rt Hon Sir 
Michael 
Myers 
1929–
1946 
Motueka Wellington College, 
Canterbury College 
(LLB) 
Clerk, Bell Gully and Izard. 
Barrister 
7 Rt Hon Sir 
Humphrey 
O’Leary 
1946–
dying in 
office in 
1953. 
Wairau 
Valley 
Wellington College, 
Victoria University 
(LLB) 
Clerk, Phineas Levi, partner Bell 
Gully, Bell and Myers 1922 
8 Rt Hon Sir 
Harold 
Barrowclough 
1953–
1966 
Masterton  Palmerston North Boys 
High, Otago University 
NZ expeditionary Force WWI, 
legal practice in Dunedin, then 
partner Russell McVeagh Bagnall 
and Macky, and service in WWII. 
9 Rt Hon Sir 
Richard Wild 
1966–
1978 
Blenheim  Fielding Agricultural 
High School, Victoria 
University (LLB, LLM) 
Secretary to Sir Humphrey 
O’Leary when he took silk in 
1935; then legal practice on his 
own accord followed by service in 
WWII. Post-war, partner, Bell 
Gully and Co, Judge Advocate 
General (1955); Solicitor-General 
(1957). 
10 Rt Hon Sir 
Ronald 
Davison 
1978–
1989 
Kaponga  Auckland University 
(LLB) 
Served WWII, legal practice in 
Auckland, mainly as a barrister.  
11 Rt Hon Sir 
Thomas 
Eichelbaum 
1989–
1999 
Königsberg, 
Germany, 
family 
escaped 
Nazi 
Victoria University 
(LLB) 
Legal practice, Wellington. High 
Court judge in 1982. Additional 
Court of Appeal judge 1989. First 
CJ to be appointed from the bench. 
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Germany in 
1931. 
12 Rt Hon Dame 
Sian Elias 
1999–
present 
London, 
England 
Auckland University 
(LLB Hons); JSM 
Stanford 
Began legal practice in Auckland 
in 1972; Law Commissioner 
1986–1990; High Court, 1995. 
Second CJ to be appointed from 
the bench. 
 
